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CRIMINAL LAW-Parole-State Board of Parole Must Issue
Statement of Reasons for Denial of Parole. United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925
(2d Cir. 1974).
Thomas Johnson had served nearly seven years of his fifteen to
sixteen year sentence as a second felony offender' when he was de-
nied parole in March, 1973. The New York State Board of Parole,
in continuing his imprisonment for at least another year, failed to
provide Johnson with any statement detailing the reasons for its
decision. He petitioned pro se for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
which liberally construed it as an application for injunctive relief.2
The court found that due process considerations required the Board
to issue a statement giving its reasons for denial of parole,3 both as
a guide for the prisoner's rehabilitative efforts and as an enduring
record for possible appellate review.4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,' holding
that a statement of reasons for denial of parole was a constitutional
necessity.' The majority argued that however great the legislative
grant of power to the Board may be, there nonetheless existed a need
to preserve a prisoner's access to judicial review.' This right could
be effectively exercised only if the Board were required to keep a
record of the rationale employed in making its decision.'
To reach this point, the court had to deal with its ruling in
1. Prior to 1967, when a New York court sentenced a second or third
felony offender it could either suspend sentence or impose an indetermi-
nate sentence with a minimum-length of time not less than one half of the
statutory maximum and a maximum double the statutory maximum. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW OF 1909, § 1941(1) (McKinney 1967), as amended, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
2. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of
Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1974).
3. Id. at 418.
4. Id. at 419.
5. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 363 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
6. 500 F.2d at 929.
7. Id. at 930-31.
8. Id. at 934.
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Menechino v. Oswald,' which held that due process rights did not
attach to the parole release hearing. 0 Menechino was paroled from
prison in 1963, declared delinquent, and returned to prison. After
an unsuccessful challenge of the constitutionality of the revocation
hearing,"I he was denied parole in a new release hearing. Menechino
then sought a declaratory judgment that in a release hearing he was
entitled, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
to counsel, notice of charges, a fair hearing, the right to call wit-
nesses in his own behalf, cross-examination, and finally, a state-
ment of reasons for denial..' The court denied his claim on two
grounds: (1) a parole release hearing was not an adversarial proceed-
ing of the nature that would require observance of the rights of an
accused; and (2) since plaintiff did not presently enjoy any liberty,
and since the parole board possessed "absolute and exclusive" dis-
cretion as to the matter of his release, he lacked sufficient interest
to entitle him to procedural due process. 4 The decision in
Menechino had been mirrored in at least two other circuits,"' and
9. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
10. 430 F.2d at 407-08.
11. Menechino v. Division of Parole, 32 App. Div. 2d 761, 762, 301
N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (1st Dep't 1969). Menechino based his claim upon the
absence of counsel at the revocation hearing. He had also attacked a later
release hearing as cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment. Both claims were dismissed. Id. at 762, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 352-53.
12. 430 F.2d at 404-05.
13. Id. at 407. Further, the court found that an actual "identity of
interest" existed between the prisoner and the Board "to the extent that
it [the Board] is seeking to encourage and foster his [the prisoner's]
rehabilitation and readjustment to society." Id.
14. Id. at 408-09.
15. In Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc), remanded for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809
(1974), a federal prisoner alleged that the Board denied him due process
in a parole release proceeding. The court, prefacing its opinion with a
statement as to the "absolute discretion" of the Board, dismissed the
claim, stating: "Scarpa now attempts to equate the possibility of condi-
tional freedom with the right to conditional freedom. We find such logic
unacceptable." Id. at 282 (footnote omitted). The Third Circuit had al-
ready dealt with the parole release question in Madden v. New Jersey
State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189 (3d Cir. 1971) and Mosley v. Ashby, 459
F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1972). Both cases maintained that the summary release
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thus presented a formidable obstacle to the final result in Johnson.
One method of overcoming the Menechino reasoning was sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,"6 where the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was extended to a
parole revocation hearing. Chief Justice Burger stated that proce-
dural protections should not depend upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a "right" or "privilege," but rather
should be based upon the presence or absence of grievous loss on the
part of the individual. 7 Finding such a loss on the part of the paro-
lee, the Court then ruled the resulting interest to be within the
"liberty or property" wording of the fourteenth amendment. 8
Hence, due process applied, but this did not mean that the full
array of rights available to the accused in a criminal proceeding
were also available in a parole revocation hearing. 9 Due process,
noted the Court, is a flexible concept, and can be molded to fit the
particular situation.' Here, the parolee was entitled to a hearing, a
notice of alleged violations, disclosure of damaging evidence, the
right to appear in person before the Board, the right to cross-
examine, plus a written statement by the fact-finder as to evidence
proceeding violated no federal rights of the prisoner, although Mosley
noted that New Jersey state law had recently required the Board to issue
a statement of reasons for denial. See Note, The Parole Release Decision-
Due Process and Discretion, 33 LA. L. REv. 708 (1973); text accompanying
note 48 infra.
16. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
17. Id. at 481. This was hardly a novel issue; the Court had taken this
position several times before. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
18. 408 U.S. at 482.
19. Id. at 489.
20. Id. at 481. "As these and other cases make clear, consideration of
what procedures due process may require under any given set of circum-
stances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the gov-
ernment function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action." Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); accord, FCC v. WJR, The
Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949); see Hagar v. Reclama-
tion Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708-09 (1884).
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relied upon and reasons for revocation.'
Prior to Morrissey, parole had long been considered a matter of
privilege and discretion,22 an "act of grace" 3 almost beyond judicial
review. Morrissey destroyed this concept, not through a direct at-
tack on the power of the parole boards, but rather through a consti-
tutionally based assertion of the parolee's rights.24 It should be
noted, however, that Morrissey is not precisely on point, insofar as
it applied only to parole revocation hearings." The Court actually
indicated that the result might well be different in a parole release
situation."
This was the state of the law27 that confronted the court of appeals
21. 408 U.S. at 488-89.
22. Cagle v. Harris, 349 F.2d 404, 404-05 (8th Cir. 1965); Berry v. State
Bd. of Parole, 148 Colo. 547, 548, 367 P.2d 338, 339 (1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 927 (1962). Sometimes called the "hands off" approach, the
theory is buttressed by several different reasons, including the belief that
parole is a privilege, not a right, that prisoners have no rights after trial,
that release proceedings, because of their very nature, should be discretion-
ary and subjective, that applying for parole is akin to making a contract
with the state, and finally, that to do otherwise would cause disruption and
unnecessary delay. For a discussion of these factors, see Jacob & Sharma,
Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-
Correctional Process, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 493, 550-51 (1970).
23. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
24. At any rate, the power of the parole boards could no longer be
considered as completely absolute. The Second Circuit, after Menechino,
indicated that it no longer considered the "act of grace" theory tenable
when it was offered to counter due process. United States ex rel. Bey v.
Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1971).
25. Judge Hays, dissenting in Johnson, noted that a parolee has his
conditional freedom, a present interest that is protected by the fourteenth
amendment under Morrissey. An inmate applying for parole, it can be
argued, does not have his freedom, but only an expectancy, and thus due
process would not attach. 500 F.2d at 936-37 (Hays, J., dissenting).
26. 408 U.S. at 482 n.8.
27. Favoring a statement of reasons were Childs v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973) and Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F.
Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973). See 50 N.D.L. REv. 503 (1974). United States
ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973) also required
such a statement. Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th
Cir. 1973) and Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1974) ruled
against the statement of reasons requirement.
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as it considered the case of Thomas Johnson. Menechino had deter-
mined that due process did not attach to the parole release proceed-
ing, and, since Morrissey was not controlling,28 might well have been
allowed to stand. Still, one of the twin pillars upon which
Menechino had rested had been removed by the Supreme Court. It
could no longer be claimed that the prisoner's potential liberty was
an insufficient interest,29 and thus not subject to the protection of
the fourteenth amendment. The new measure was to be the amount
of loss the individual would suffer as the result of government ac-
tion,'" rather than any classification of the interest as a right or
privilege. Writing for the majority in Johnson, Judge Mansfield
seized upon Morrissey's finding of such a loss on the part of the
parolee, and applied the same reasoning in finding that the prisoner
has a very definite stake in the outcome of the parole release pro-
ceeding. 1 Calling the prospect of parole a "conditional entitle-
ment" to freedom, he concluded that "some degree of due process
attaches to parole release proceedings. ' 33 This being established,
the vindication of these procedural safeguards requires access to
28. There was a technical ground of distinction. See note 25 supra.
29. 408 U.S. at 482.
30. Id. at 481.
31. 500 F.2d at 928.
32. Id. This phrase was borrowed from the opinion of the trial court,
363 F. Supp. at 418, and is meant to convey the idea that the right matures
as the statutory prescriptions are met. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261-62 (1970). One noted commentator, speaking with regard to welfare
benefits, has described the idea of entitlement as "simply that when indi-
viduals have insufficient resources to live under conditions of health and
decency, society has obligations to provide support, and the individual is
entitled to that support as of right." Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965). This
entitlement may be preserved through constitutional restraints on state
power, regardless of whether the entitlement is referred to as a right or
privilege. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). This concept has suc-
cessfully been applied to the possessory interest of the buyer under a condi-
tional sales contract, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), unemployment
compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), tax exemptions,
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), and public employment, Slo-
chower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
33. 500 F.2d at 928.
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judicial review, which, in turn, necessitates a statement of reasons
for denial of parole. 4
Despite this, the court did not overrule Menechino,5 noting that
"[a] determination that an inmate being considered for release on
parole is entitled to one due process weapon (e.g., a statement of
reasons) would not necessarily entitle him to the full panoply."3
This statement is apparently in accord with Morrissey's view that
different process may be due in different situations. 7
Judge Hays dissented in Johnson" on the ground that Menechino
still controlled. 9 Pointing to Morrissey's explicit distinction be-
tween the parolee's present freedom and the actual inmate's mere
hope of freedom, he argued that the majority had extended that
case's holding beyond its proper bounds." The majority, however,
met this objection,4 citing authority to the effect that the process
due a particular individual will turn upon the extent to which he is
34. Id. at 929.
35. Id. at 928.
36. Id.
37. 408 U.S. at 481.
38. 500 F.2d at 935 (Hays, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 936.
40. Judge Hays stated: "The opinion in Menechino provides no basis
for the position that its reasoning, which logically applies to all the relief
requested by plaintiff there, was not intended to apply to requests for
statements of reasons." Id. (Hays, J., dissenting). This interpretation of
Morrissey is not without textual support. See notes 24 & 27 supra.
41. The Johnson majority recognized the statement made in Morrissey
as to the possible differing results in a parole release hearing, but went on
to say that "this hardly indicates that due process is to be applied to parole
revocation merely because the conditional freedom was presently being
enjoyed, which would be nothing more than a reincarnation of the right-
privilege dichotomy in a not-too-deceptive disguise." 500 F.2d at 927-28
n.2. The footnote continues: "The Court was simply reinforcing its point
that conditional liberty permits much greater freedom of action by the
parolee than does confinement in prison." Id. Similar disposal of
Morrissey's distinction was made in Craft v. Attorney General, 379 F.
Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974), where the court argued that since the pertinent
part of Morrissey had been based upon Menechino, a Second Circuit case,
then Johnson should cast doubt upon its continued viability. Id. at 540.
This case went on to quote Johnson favorably and hold "that the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution is applicable to parole hearings
.... " Id. at 539.
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threatened with grievous loss.42 This is the measure which the court
then used in determining the prisoner's interest.43 The holding in
Menechino was not that the prisoner lacked an interest because of
the ephemeral nature of his anticipated freedom. Rather,
Menechino stood for the proposition that since New York's legisla-
ture had given such great power to the Board of Parole, the prisoner
had no "right" subject to the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment.44 This was a mere restatement of the old "act of grace"45
theory of parole which had been obviated by Morrissey.4" The major-
ity in Johnson is not equating the parole release and revocation
hearings; to the contrary, it has adopted Morrissey's claim that due
process is flexible,47 and used this statement as a touchstone for its
inquiry into the need for a statement of reasons.
This being understood, Johnson's analysis can serve as a model
in future court tests of the parole release hearing. Investigation will
be necessary to determine exactly what elements of due process are
required. Menechino maintains, and quite correctly, that the due
process protections available to an accused are not necessary.
Johnson merely requires a statement of reasons. Future litigation
will probably explore the gray area between the two cases until the
procedure most nearly consonant with the release proceeding has
been defined.
Several other courts, albeit for varying reasons, have concluded
that a statement of reasons is necessary in a parole hearing. The
leading jurisdiction in this regard has been New Jersey. The New
Jersey State Parole Board had long followed a policy of refusing to
reveal the reasons behind its decisions,48 and the state courts had
42. 500 F.2d at 928.
43. Id. at 929.
44. The court in Menechino stated: "The Board's exercise of this dis-
cretionary power has been held by New York's highest court to be absolute
and beyond court review as long as the Board violates no positive statutory
requirement." 430 F.2d at 406.
45. See note 22 supra and text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
46. The Court in Morrissey stated: "It is hardly useful any longer to
try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a
'right' or a 'privilege.'" 408 U.S. at 482.
47. 500 F.2d at 928.
48. Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 241, 277 A.2d
193, 194 (1971).
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long upheld this policy. 9 In Monks v. New Jersey State Board of
Parole," however, the state supreme court held that although the
Board possessed broad and discretionary powers,51 the furnishing of
a statement of reasons was demanded by" 'considerations of simple
fairness.' "5 The case has resulted in some confusion as to the ra-
tionale of its holding,53 but the result seems to have been the first
of its kind in this area. Later, the Third Circuit54 acknowledged
Monks as the law of New Jersey and added that "[a] claim of
denial of such a statement, minimally at least, can be construed on
this record as setting forth a denial of the equal protection of the
laws." This extended the foundation of the possible right to such
a statement beyond the "fairness" of Monks and put it on the level
of a constitutional protection, much as had Johnson.
Nevertheless, several jurisdictions refused to follow the lead of the
Third Circuit. In Childs v. United States Board of Parole,5" the
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that it was the due
process clause that required the Board to issue a statement of rea-
sons.57 The rationale employed was similar to that later seen in
Johnson, as the court pointed out that the inherent flexibility of due
process would allow it to extend to the parole release proceeding.58
Alternate grounds for a similar decision were found in King v.
United States, 9 where it was held that a statement of reasons was
required of the United States Board of Parole under the provisions
49. See, e.g., Puchalski v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 104 N.J.
Super. 294, 250 A.2d 19 (App. Div.), aff'd, 55 N.J. 113, 259 A.2d 713 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Mastriana v. New Jersey State Parole
Bd., 95 N.J. Super. 351, 231 A.2d 236 (App. Div. 1967). See also Madden
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189 (3d Cir. 1971).
50. 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
51. Id. at 249, 277 A.2d at 199.
52. Id., quoting Appellate Division Judge (later U.S. Supreme Court
Justice) Brennan in White v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 17 N.J. Super.
580, 586, 86 A.2d 422, 425 (App. Div. 1952).
53. See 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 219 (1972).
54. Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 993.
56. 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973).
57. Id. at 1247.
58. Id.
59. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
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of the Administrative Procedure Act.60
The conclusion of many courts, therefore, was that a statement
was and should be required. Disagreement existed only in the ques-
tion of what the best route to this result might be.
Similar developments have been taking place in some state
courts. The Supreme Court of California, in In re Sturm,6 has con-
cluded that the state's Adult Authority "in the absence of a defini-
tive written statement of its reasons for denying parole at a regularly
scheduled parole hearing. . . deprives the inmate of procedural due
process of law." 2 In the course of its opinion the court reviewed the
usual procedure 3 employed by the Authority. Each hearing lasted
no more than ten minutes. While one member of the board inter-
viewed the prisoner before it, the other would be busily reading the
file of the next prisoner. Significantly, the two members seldom
disagreed in their vote. While minutes were taken of these meetings
and provided to the inmate's correctional counselor, they were gen-
erally uninformative. Indeed, in this case the minutes were "entirely
cryptic" 4 and insufficient to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments.65
60. Id. at 1345. Although mention was made of Menechino and
Morrissey, the court stated that it did not have to reach the constitutional
arguments. Id. at 1343. The court then went on to rule that the U.S. Parole
Board was not exempt from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53 (Supp. III,
1973), explaining that "[tihe Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ap-
plies to each 'agency' which means 'each authority of the Government of
the United States.' " 492 F.2d at 1343. Since Congress created the United
States Parole Board in the Department of Justice, consisting of "eight
members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advise and
consent of the Senate," under 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970), and since there was
no explicit exemption of the Board from the APA, it follows that 5 U.S.C.
§ 555(e) (1970) is controlling. 492 F.2d at 1345. It provides: "Prompt notice
shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application,
petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection with
any agency proceedings. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the
denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief state-
ment of the grounds for denial." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970).
61. 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974) (en banc).
62. Id. at 272, 521 P.2d at 107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
63. Id. at 262, 521 P.2d at 99, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
64. Id. at 263, 521 P.2d at 100, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
65. Id. at 272, 521 P.2d at 107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
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New York's lower courts have been undertaking a cautious shift
in the direction of cases like In re Sturm. As late as 1969, the New
York Court of Appeals had held the state's Board of Parole to be
practically exempt from judicial review." Despite this, several lower
courts have clearly been influenced by the decisions in Johnson and
Monks. 7 As of this writing, however, resistance to the reasons re-
66. Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 29, 246
N.E.2d 512, 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969). See also Pickus v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. Cummings v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 137, 350 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct.
1973), cited the district court's opinion in Johnson and ruled that a reasons
requirement existed in New York. Four days later, in a different case of
the same name, Cummings v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 357, 350 N.Y.S.2d 842
(Sup. Ct. 1973), the same court said: "This does not mean that the Parole
Board must make findings of fact, and must comment on every item in the
prisoner's file and relate it to the standards of the statute governing parole.
It does mean that the Board must, however briefly, state the ultimate
ground of its decision denying parole with sufficient particularity to enable
the prisoner to understand how he is expected to regulate his behavior and
to enable a reviewing court to determine whether inadmissible factors have
influenced the decision, and to determine whether discretion has been
abused." Id. at 360, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 847. This language outlines a type of
statement implied in Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J.
348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973), and explicitly required in Sturm. An oral state-
ment will apparently suffice in New York courts. Hamm v. Regan, 43 App.
Div. 2d 344, 351 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep't 1974). After rejection of his appli-
cation for parole, Hamm was told: "'One thing that the Statute says to
us is we must consider the community into which the guy has been paroled
and the prevailing attitude there into which he will go. It was felt by the
parole board that it would be a negative community reaction to your re-
lease and that was the reason for the change in the decision. It was believed
that it would be better for us to come to you and say that to you face to
face so you will have an opportunity to respond to and that's what I have
done.'" Id. at 345, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 744. The court noted that nothing in
N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 213, 214 (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1974) required a statement of reasons to be given for denial. The
district court's decision in Johnson was mentioned, but the court then
went on to say that they did not have to rule on the reasons requirement
since here a reason had in fact been given (i.e., negative community reac-
tion). 43 App. Div. 2d at 347, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46. Judge Cook's dissent
pointed out that "negative community reaction" did not equal incompati-
bility with the welfare of society, a reason enunciated in section 213. Id.
at 349, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (Cooke, J., dissenting). It may be argued that
[Vol. III
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quirement has once again reasserted itself. 8 Of course, Johnson, in
providing the prisoner with a federal forum and an authoritative
precedent, will remove most of the impetus for any change in New
York law.
It can readily be seen that the right established by Johnson could
be effectively crippled by permitting the Board to issue a mere pro
forma statement. Several courts have thus directed their attention
to the content of the statement of reasons. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey faced this question in Beckworth v. New Jersey State
Parole Board.69 After Monks, the Board issued "terse" statements
of reasons, 0 apparently designed with an eye towards minimal com-
pliance with the new ruling. These statements were of course
promptly challenged on grounds of insufficiency.7 Faced with this
flood of litigation, the Board agreed to review its former denials and
issue new statements." The plaintiff in Beckworth was again denied
parole following this review, so he renewed his challenge on grounds
that the statement was still insufficient.
Beckworth had been imprisoned for murder after he had killed his
friend's wife following an argument. The statement of reasons listed
such factors as his attempted suicide, his recurring bouts with alco-
holism, his longstanding hostility towards women, and his at-
tempted escape as contributing toward the Board's doubts that he
could function outside of prison. This statement was ruled accept-
able.74
this case not only ignored the clear trend of such cases as Johnson and
Monks, but also caused an injustice to the prisoner. What action could an
inmate take on his own behalf to allay the apprehension of the community?
The reason was bad, and the statement resultantly inadequate. The most
recent New York decision enunciating a reasons requirement is Solari v.
Vincent, 77 Misc. 2d 54, 353 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1974), which held that
since section 213 of the New York Correction Law set forth reasons for
granting parole "logic, reason, and basic fairness dictate that reasons
should also be stated for parole denial." Id. at 56-57, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
68. See Cummings v. Regan, 45 App. Div. 2d 415, 358 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d
Dep't 1974), rev'g 76 Misc. 2d 357, 350 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
69. 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973).
70. Id. at 350, 301 A.2d at 728.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 351, 301 A.2d at 728.
73. Id. at 353, 301 A.2d at 730.
74. Id.
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Two federal cases have made a Beckworth-type analysis of the
adequacy of such a statement. Candarini v. Attorney General75 held
that "explicit reasons for denial"7 are needed, while Application of
Wilkerson" approved a format that contained substantially less."8
Candarini noted with favor the format used by the New Jersey
Board in Beckworth, saying:
What is required is that the Board set forth sufficient facts and reasons to
enable a reviewing court to ascertain whether an abuse of discretion has been
committed and to enable the inmate to know why he has been denied parole
and what he can do to better regulate his future conduct.7
The United States Board of Parole now requires the issuance of a
statement of reasons."0 It also uses a table of guidelines8' designed
to promote fairer and more consistent exercise of discretion.82 Prob-
lems, however, arise when the offense being considered is not one
that has been included on the table 3 or when a statement is issued
75. 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
76. Id. at 1137.
77. 371 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). In an opinion written by Judge
Dooling, who had written for the majority in Johnson when that case was
in the district court, the court approved the following statement: "1. Your
release at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense commit-
ted and it is thus incompatible with the welfare of society. 2. You need
additional institutional treatments, specifically academic, vocational and
correctional counselling to enhance your capacity to lead a law abiding
life." Id. at 123-24. It is difficult to reconcile the above statement with the
example set forth in Beckworth and the criteria adopted by the district
court in the earlier Candarini case. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
78. 371 F. Supp. at 124.
79. 369 F. Supp. at 1137.
80. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13 (1974).
81. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 at 68-73 (1974), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 45226
(1974).
82. Id.
83. This was the situation in Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925 (D.
Conn. 1973). The prisoner's offense, a failure to appear before the Board,
was not on the table. Still, the court inferred that the table had been used.
Id. at 930. The prisoner maintained that reasons other than those on the
table must be listed in the statement. The court replied that neither the
Board's procedure nor the Constitution required a statement of all reasons
simply because it chooses to list some. Id. at 931.
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that is based only on the table.84 These new regulations are a step
in the right direction, but it is clear that application of the reasoning
of Beckworth and Candarini will be needed to prevent the emascu-
lation of the statement of reasons.
Johnson might well become the prototype case for those many
jurisdictions where the nature of parole is, at best, a source of confu-
sion, and at worst, a source of injustice. Its artful disarming of
Menechino will attract attention in those states that are presently
bound by similar decisions. Once Johnson and its contention that a
prisoner has a constitutionally protected interest in the outcome of
a parole release proceeding is accepted, the courts can then proceed
to delineate the bounds of the process required to protect this inter-
est.85
William B. Smith
84. See Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1974).
85. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that before a prisoner could be stripped of his "good time" credits he
was entitled to a modicum of due process, the amount to be determined
through a "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objec-
tives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general applica-
tion." Id. at 556. Under the above formula, the prisoner here was entitled
to a) advance written notice of charges, no less than 24 hours before the
hearing; b) a written statement by the fact finder as to reasons relied upon;
and c) the right to call witnesses and introduce evidence. But the Court
noted the possible havoc cross-examination of fellow prisoners could wreak
and therefore held it not required and further stated that the prisoner had
no right to counsel in this type of hearing. Id. at 567-69. The situations in
Wolff and Johnson are somewhat similar, the only possible grounds of
distinction being the present versus potential possession distinction which
Johnson has discredited. The protections afforded in Wolff, however,
might be subject to one further limitation. If a procedure becomes too
time-consuming and affects the speedy dispatch of parole applications, a
court might well refuse to require the process of Wolff in the parole release
hearing. It is submitted that allowing the prisoner to call witnesses and
present evidence would have such an effect, and should thus not be re-
quired. On the basis of this reasoning, the statement of reasons might well
be the outer limit of due process in the parole release hearing.
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